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CHAPTER 1 A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty: 
Reassessing the Added Deterrent 
Value of Nuclear Weapons
Benoît Pelopidas
“Concepts, first employed to make things intelligible, are 
clung to often when they make them unintelligible.”
William James1
The Argument
A world free of nuclear weapons has been seen as an exercise in utopian 
dreaming.2 It took the credentials of realists like Secretaries Shultz, Perry, 
and Kissinger and Senator Nunn to bring this goal back to the front of the 
1.  William James, “The compounding of consciousness,” in The Writings of William 
James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. J. McDermott (Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 1977), 560. (Original work published in 1909.)
2.  Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 19, 2007; Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” 
The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007–2008). This framing of the 
discussion in terms of reality versus utopia or fantasy is topical and can be found 
in most countries. In the French case, for example, one of the leading articles 
against this goal was Tiphaine de Champchesnel, “Un monde sans armes 
nucléaires. L’utopie du zéro” (A World without Nuclear Weapons: The Utopia of 
Zero), French Yearbook of International Relations, vol. 11, 2010. This builds on 
my op-ed, “Why nuclear realism is unrealistic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
September 26, 2013.
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US political scene.3 But framing the discussion in terms of utopia versus 
reality is deceptive because in actuality both supporters and critics of 
this goal hold to a vision of the world as they think it ought to be. On 
the one hand, setting a goal of a world without nuclear weapons while 
there are still approximately seventeen thousands of them in the world 
today is clearly ambitious.4 On the other hand, those who reject this goal 
and want to continue to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation have to 
assume that this strategy will work perfectly until the end of days.5 There 
is no third future.6 Either nuclear weapons remain in numbers higher than 
necessary to create a global-scale disaster and we have to rely on deter-
rence and hope for the best or we reach very low numbers or zero and 
the issue then will be to make sure that they are not rebuilt. Even if a 
3.  Martin Senn and Christoph Elhardt, “Bourdieu and the bomb: Power, language and 
the doxic battle over the value of nuclear weapons,” European Journal of International 
Relations 20, no. 2 (June 2014): 316–340. 
4.  See Plougshares Fund’s report based on the compiled estimates of Hans Kristensen 
and Robert Norris for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 2012,  
http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/Stockpile-Report-082814.pdf.
5.  We are much more demanding with nuclear weapons used for deterrence than we 
are with any other technology: they are not allowed to fail once if failure means the 
launch of a nuclear weapon. Moreover, proponents of nuclear deterrence expect 
the strategy of deterrence to work forever. It is worth repeating that the original propo-
nents of nuclear deterrence combined with a focus on sovereign states saw this as a 
“tentative, second-best, and temporary” solution. See Daniel Deudney, Bounding 
Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 247.
6.  A third future would contemplate the breaking of the so-called nuclear taboo and the 
conventionalization of the use of nuclear weapons. It would not only require that 
the weapons are used but that this use leads to a move away from deterrence toward 
preventive war as a strategy. This is only one possible consequence of the use of 
nuclear weapons and, so far, it is not considered likely. See Mark Fitzpatrick, “The 
World After: Proliferation, Deterrence and Disarmament if the Nuclear Taboo is 
 Broken,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Proliferation Paper 31 (Spring 
2009); and George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken 
Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
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credible missile defense system could be built, it would not constitute a 
third future; it would just be another parameter in the choice between 
these two futures.7
Proponents of a world without nuclear weapons use the rhetoric of 
only two possible futures: either getting to zero or nuclear proliferation.8 
But getting to very low numbers versus trusting nuclear deterrence forever 
reflects a more fundamental truth. This depiction of future choices does 
not make any assumption about the pace of proliferation or the connec-
tion between nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation.
If the only two available futures are getting to zero (or very low num-
bers) and relying on luck forever, which future ought to be realized? This 
is not a question of realism or utopia. It is a question of political choice: 
we either wager on perpetual luck or we wager on the ability of people to 
adjust to new international environments. Which future do you choose as 
a goal before putting your forces into the battle to “bring the ‘is’ closer to 
the ‘ought’”?9 Maybe the proponents of nuclear deterrence assume that a 
7.  The current projects about missile defense do not intend to replace nuclear deterrence 
but to complement it, contrary to President Ronald Reagan’s original idea. So even if a 
credible missile-defense system could be built, the reliance on nuclear deterrence 
would still exist. And the jury is still out on whether missile defense would facilitate 
the elimination of nuclear weapons. A good approach to this debate can be found in 
Tom Sauer, Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: The Role of Missile Defense (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011).
8.  A recent example of this common argument can be found in Scott Sagan, “A call for 
global nuclear disarmament,” Nature 487, (July 5, 2012): 31. He writes, “The choice 
is . . . between a world free of nuclear weapons or one with many more nuclear 
states.” 
9.  This is George Shultz’s expression in Harry’s Last Lecture on May 19, 2009, at Stanford 
University: “The power of the ought,” borrowing the title of Max Kampelman’s presen-
tation for the twentieth anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit on October 11, 2006, at 
the Hoover Institution. See also Steven P. Andreasen, “Introduction: Closing the Gap 
Between the ‘I’ and the ‘Ought,’” in Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of 
Nuclear Weapons, ed. George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, and 
James E. Goodby (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008).
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civilization-destroying disaster will happen before nuclear weapons are 
used, so that their priorities lie elsewhere, but this bet is not made explicit 
or maybe they imply that future nuclear weapons use is inevitable and 
can be limited. Those are debatable assumptions which should be made 
explicit and become part of the conversation. Once this is done and the 
proponents of nuclear deterrence acknowledge the fundamental problem 
of global nuclear vulnerability, the burden of proof will be shared more 
equally and the ethical and political questions about which future we 
want to strive for will be fruitfully reopened.
The Case for Nuclear Deterrence
In this paper, I address three of the most frequently used arguments for 
maintaining a significant measure of dependence for international secu-
rity on nuclear deterrence both globally and regionally:10
1. Nuclear weapons have deterred great powers from waging war 
against each other, so a world without nuclear weapons will lead 
to, or at least might encourage, great-power war.
2. The US nuclear umbrella has deterred nuclear proliferation, so 
the reduction of the US nuclear arsenal will undermine the 
credibility of US extended deterrence and create additional 
incentives for nuclear proliferation.
3. Nuclear weapons have deterred other powers from invading the 
territory of those states that possess nuclear weapons and thus 
10.  A fourth objection I do not address here would emphasize that nuclear weapons are 
an incomparable instrument for coercive diplomacy. Todd S. Sechser and Matthew 
Fuhrmann convincingly rebut this objection in a recent study showing that nuclear 
weapons do not provide more leverage than conventional weapons in crisis situa-
tions. See “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67, 
no. 1 (January 2013): 173–195.
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leaders of countries with relatively weak conventional capabili-
ties will keep their weapons as an equalizer. A version of this 
argument focuses on dictatorial regimes or “rogue states” whose 
very existence depends on their having nuclear weapons.
I argue that none of these arguments holds.
These three arguments for acquiring and keeping nuclear arsenals rest 
on the power of these weapons to deter an action, whether a great- powers 
war, nuclear proliferation, or invasion of and regime change in weaker 
nations. But deterrence of such an action is most often based on the cred-
ibility of a set of national capabilities that include all the non-nuclear 
assets of a nation, including its credibility as an ally. Therefore, deterrence 
should not be identified with nuclear weapons and defined by them as 
has become the habit, almost unconsciously.11 The added deterrent value 
of nuclear weapons,12 rather than their deterrent value per se, has to be 
reexamined, keeping in mind that conventional weapons and other fac-
tors (economic, as an example) can have a deterrent effect with a much 
higher credibility of actual use.13
After showing that these arguments are not as convincing as their fre-
quency suggests, I will delineate opportunities which advocates for a 
nuclear-free world should exploit on their way to advancing their goal, 
based on the decoupling of nuclear weapons and deterrence.
11.  Patrick Morgan and George Quester remind us that the concept of deterrence 
predates the invention of nuclear weapons and show how mutual nuclear deter-
rence as we know it was not codified before the late 1950s and early 1960s. See 
“How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence” in Deterrence: Its 
Past and Future, ed. George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2011).
12.  This builds on Steven P. Lee’s notion of the “marginal deterrent value” of 
nuclear weapons in Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 132ff.
13.  Ibid., 124–129.
GS_WarNotFought.indb   9 3/5/15   8:47 AM
10  |  BENOÎT PELOPIDAS
One cannot state for certain that great-power war  
will be more likely in a world without nuclear weapons
The most intimidating critique of the goal of a world free of nuclear weap-
ons is that it would make the world safe for further war among great pow-
ers. Its most eloquent proponent was probably Winston Churchill, who 
warned his fellow citizens: “Be careful above all things not to let go of the 
atomic weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means 
of preserving peace are in your hands.”14 In other words, according to 
Kenneth Waltz, “abolishing the weapons that have caused sixty-five years 
of peace would certainly have effects. It would, among other things, make 
the world safe for the fighting of World War III.”15 This common belief is 
summarized in the famous October 2009 Time magazine article: “Want 
peace? Give a Nuke the Nobel.”16
I will show three major flaws in this statement. First, it assumes that 
we can know for sure what caused peace and neglects several compet-
ing hypotheses explaining the absence of great-power wars. Second, 
it thus assumes that nuclear weapons are either the only, or at least a 
necessary, cause of great-power peace. Third, it assumes a stark contrast 
between the world of the last seventy years, which have appeared rela-
tively “peaceful,” and a world without nuclear weapons that would be 
war-prone.
14.  Quoted by Margaret Thatcher at Lord Mayor’s banquet, November 10, 1986,  
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106512; and most recently by  
Bruno  Tertrais, “The Illogic of Zero,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 2 
(April 2010): 136.
15.  Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Great Debate,” The National Interest, September–October 
2010, 92. 
16.  David Von Drehle, “Want peace? Give a Nuke the Nobel,” Time,  
October 11, 2009.
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The “nuclear peace” is only a risky hypothesis among others
We cannot know for sure what caused the absence of great-power wars 
over the last seventy years.17 We are left with dueling counterfactuals and 
the need to bet and trust.18 The opponents of the goal of a world without 
nuclear weapons create a false dichotomy between what we know for 
a fact and what we hypothesize. On the one hand, they argue, is the hard 
fact of the nuclear peace; on the other hand are other hypotheses or coun-
terfactual reasonings. But the nuclear peace is not a fact. It is a hypothesis 
trying to link two observable facts: the existence of nuclear weapons in 
the world since 1945 and the absence of war between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the same period. The fact is that the idea of 
the nuclear peace and competing explanations share the same status: all 
are hypotheses, requiring a rerun of the history of the last seventy years 
without nuclear weapons to see whether war would have broken out. The 
17.  One might say sixty-six years if the reference point is the Soviet Union acquiring 
nuclear weapons. The date changes again if delivery vehicles enter the assessment. In 
any case, the problem here is that high subjective confidence is not a good indicator 
of validity and that experts are not rewarded for admitting the limits of validity of 
their knowledge—quite the opposite. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), chap. 20 and pp. 262–263. 
18.  The social science literature testing this only reaches probabilistic conclusions that are 
irrelevant in a realm in which one failure would be intolerable. Robert Rauchhaus 
confirms, for example, that possession of nuclear weapons by multiple parties to a 
crisis makes them less likely to enter a crisis, in “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace 
Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 
2009): 269. There are three fundamental problems with this type of finding: (1) The 
validity of such a finding given the limited number of cases we have and the limited 
duration of the nuclear age; (2) the amount of what we don’t know about the past; 
and, (3) the past’s questionable relevance for the future. For further analysis of these 
points, see James G. March, Lee S. Sproull, and Michal Tamuz, “Learning from Sam-
ples of One or Fewer,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (February 1991); and Benoît 
Pelopidas, Renoncer à l’arme nucléaire: La séduction de l’impossible? (Giving up 
Nuclear Weapons Ambitions: The Seduction of the Impossible?) (Paris: Sciences Po 
University Press, forthcoming).
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nuclear peace hypothesis is no less a counterfactual than its rivals.19 It 
faces the challenge of proving a negative. In these circumstances, faith in 
the nuclear peace becomes a bet or a matter of trust.20
Moreover, we know that complex and tightly coupled systems like 
nuclear weapons are doomed to fail eventually, even if the frequency of 
failure is very low. This is because their complexity and tight coupling 
don’t allow for anticipating and testing of every possible failure.21 Given 
this epistemological challenge, which relies ultimately on the trust one 
puts in one potential cause of peace at the expense of the others and on 
the expected timing of nuclear versus non-nuclear disasters, at least one 
question arises: is seventy years a high enough standard of evidence for 
us to surrender our fate to nuclear weapons forever?22
19.  John Mueller, “Epilogue: Duelling Counterfactuals,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront 
the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, ed. John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, 
Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and 
Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 13. 
20.  The claim that the nuclear peace hypothesis is true results from a common fallacy 
which consists in turning a correlation between two variables into a causal relation-
ship. Cognitive psychology shows how common this is given that intuition “automat-
ically and effortlessly identifies causal relations between events, sometimes even 
when the connection is spurious.” Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 110; see 
also 75, 114–118.
21.  See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies 
 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2; Scott Sagan, The Limits of 
Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); and Matthew Rendall, “Nuclear Weapons and Intergenera-
tional Exploitation,” Security Studies 16, no. 4 (October 2007). Drell and Goodby 
rightly characterize the view that nuclear deterrence will always work as “an exercise 
in wishful thinking,” in Sidney Drell and James Goodby, “The Reality: A Goal of a 
World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3  
(Summer 2008): 29. This critique was particularly strong in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
22.  Assuming validity and reliability is a common mistake psychologists call “the law of 
small numbers.” In our judgments about the validity of claims, we tend to pay more 
GS_WarNotFought.indb   12 3/5/15   8:47 AM
A BET PORTRAYED AS A CERTAINTY  |  13
The limits of nuclear deterrence as a peacemaker23
Critics of abolition portray a world without nuclear weapons as war-
prone and believe that nuclear weapons are a necessary and sufficient 
cause for great-power peace. This is only the latest instance of an idea 
that has repeatedly been proven wrong, since at least 1860: the expec-
tation that the unprecedented destructiveness of a new weapon system 
and the threat of its use will put an end to war. This was wrong for dyna-
mite, submarines, artillery, smokeless powder, the machine gun, and poi-
son gas.24 Was nuclear deterrence a necessary and sufficient cause for 
peace among great powers? Most critics of the idea of a world without 
nuclear weapons maintain that it was. They argue that the nuclear-armed 
attention to the content of messages than to information about their reliability. 
See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, chap. 10. 
23.  The idea of a nuclear peace has been challenged for several years. See Evan 
Luard, War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology (London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1986), 396; Michael MccGwire, “Nuclear Deterrence,” International 
Affairs 82, no. 4 (June 2006): 784; Michael MccGwire, “Deterrence: The 
 Problem, Not the Solution,” International Affairs 62, no. 1 (Winter 1986); John 
Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar 
World,” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988); John Vasquez, “The Deter-
rence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War” in The Long 
Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections, ed. Charles Kegley 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1991); Ken Berry, Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pelopidas, 
Nikolai Sokov, and Ward Wilson, “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining 
the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2010; and Steven Pinker, 
The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 
2011), 268–278.
24.  For a condensed presentation of these arguments, see James Lee Ray, “The Aboli-
tion of Slavery and the End of International War,” International Organization 43, 
no. 3 (Summer 1989): 429–430. Kenneth Waltz recognizes the exception he is 
arguing for when he labels nuclear weapons as “the only peacekeeping weapon 
the world has ever known,” in “The Great Debate,” 92. The proponents of the 
 previous weapons in the list said the same thing.
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states never fought a war against each other.25 This can now be proven 
wrong. The 1969 border clash between China and Russia26 and, more 
recently, the 1999 Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan show that 
the conventional wisdom that a nuclear-armed state cannot be attacked 
is historically inaccurate. Moreover, nuclear-armed states have been 
attacked by non-nuclear-weapon states on multiple occasions. US troops 
were attacked by Chinese forces in 1950 in Korea and by Vietnamese 
forces in the 1960s and 1970s; Israel was attacked by Syria and Egypt 
in 1973 and by Iraq in 1991; and in 1982, Argentina invaded the British 
Falkland Islands.27 This narrows down the claims for nuclear weapons 
as peacemakers. More importantly, even this narrower claim needs 
to be reexamined taking into account two facts: (1) avoidance of sev-
eral nuclear disasters was due to luck and cannot be explained by 
nuclear deterrence; and (2) deterrence as a strategy has favored more 
risk-prone strategies and in some cases made war possible instead of 
preventing it.
Luck is too often taken as a confirmation that nuclear deterrence 
kept the peace.28 But luck should not be misread as successful deter- 
25.  Waltz, “The Great Debate”; Bruno Tertrais, “In defense of deterrence,” Institut 
Français des Relations Internationales, Proliferation Paper 39, Fall 2011: 9; Robert 
Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis,” 268.
26.  David Holloway, “‘Czech-mating’ China? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969,” in Historie 
Prožité Minulosti, ed. Jiří Kocian, Milan Otáhal, and Miroslav Vanĕk (Prague: Institute 
of Contemporary History, 2010).
27.  T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 145.
28.  The argument based on luck is decisive. Indeed, Paul Schroeder, who argued in 
favor of managing the nuclear danger without abolishing the weapons, recognized 
this: “If since 1945 only luck had kept the world from nuclear holocaust then one 
would have to join . . . cries for some drastic action to turn things around.” See Paul 
Schroeder, “Does Murphy’s Law Apply to History?” Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 1 
(1985): 87. I would argue that it is the case even if luck was the only reason why we 
avoided disaster in one single case. There is no need for luck to be the only cause of 
non-use of nuclear weapons to justify a call for change in nuclear policy.
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rence.29 More accurately, as Thomas Schelling noted, leaders of nuclear- 
weapon states can make threats that “leave something to chance”30—
recognizing that things could spiral out of control and nuclear weap-
ons could be used even if they do not intend to use them—to make 
those threats more credible. But including luck in a successful deter-
rence strategy, as if you could control it, is both a conceptual confu-
sion and a retrospective illusion.31 Luck was on our side this time, but 
this is not a consequence of purposeful action. For example, during the 
night of October 26–27, 1962, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, 
an American U-2 spy plane strayed into Soviet airspace over the Arctic. 
Soviet fighter jets scrambled to intercept the U-2 while F-102 interceptors 
were sent to escort it home and prevent Soviet MIGs from freely entering 
US airspace. Given the circumstances, the F-102s conventional air-to-air 
missiles had been replaced with nuclear-tipped ones and their pilots 
could decide to use nuclear weapons. According to Scott Sagan in The 
Limits of Safety, “the interceptors at Galena were armed with the nuclear 
Falcon air-to-air missiles and, under existing safety rules, were authorized 
to carry the weapons in full readiness condition in any ‘active air defense’ 
29.  On this problem, see Benoît Pelopidas, “We all lost the Cuban missile crisis,” in 
The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal, ed. Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes 
(London: Routledge, 2015).
30.  Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1960), chap. 8.
31.  Because past crises did not escalate and turn into nuclear war, we are prone to what 
psychologists call “hindsight bias” or “narrative fallacy,” which retrospectively will 
create a false causal relation between crisis management and the favorable outcome 
of the crisis which avoided nuclear war. Some of these consequences could only be 
known retrospectively; claiming hindsight is an overstatement. We are also likely to 
believe that we can learn more than we should from the favorable outcome of crises 
because we misunderstand the role of luck. See Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 
chap. 19. On this confusion, see Benoît Pelopidas, “The theorist who leaves nothing 
to chance,” paper presented at the 2014 International Studies Association confer-
ence, Toronto, March 29, 2014.
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mission.”32 Fortunately, the spy plane turned back and the Soviet jets held 
their fire.33 There are many other instances in which deterrence cannot 
account for favorable outcomes.34 Robert McNamara was direct about the 
role of luck during the Cuban missile crisis:
According to former Soviet military leaders, at the height of the crisis, 
Soviet forces in Cuba possessed 162 nuclear warheads, including at 
least 90 tactical warheads. [And the United States. was not aware 
of that at the time.] At about the same time, Cuban President Fidel 
Castro asked the Soviet ambassador to Cuba to send a cable to Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev stating that Castro urged him to counter 
a U.S. attack with a nuclear response. Clearly, there was a high risk 
that in the face of a U.S. attack, which many in the U.S. government 
were prepared to recommend to President Kennedy, the Soviet forces 
in Cuba would have decided to use their nuclear weapons rather than 
lose them. Only a few years ago did we learn that the four Soviet 
submarines trailing the U.S. Naval vessels near Cuba each carried 
torpedoes with nuclear warheads. Each of the sub commanders had 
the authority to launch his torpedoes. The situation was even more 
frightening because, as the lead commander recounted to me, the 
subs were out of communication with their Soviet bases, and they 
continued their patrols for four days after Khrushchev announced the 
withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba. The lesson, if it had not been 
clear before, was made so at a conference on the crisis held in Havana 
in 1992. . . . Near the end of that meeting, I asked Castro whether he 
would have recommended that Khrushchev use the weapons in the 
32.  Sagan, The Limits of Safety, 137.
33.  Ibid., 135-138.
34.  One of the most recent lists can be found in Martin E. Hellman, “How Risky is 
Nuclear Optimism?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 2 (2011). See also 
Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on 
the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 303ff.
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face of a U.S. invasion, and if so, how he thought the United States 
would respond. “We started from the assumption that if there was 
an invasion of Cuba, nuclear war would erupt,” Castro replied. “We 
were certain of that. . . . [W]e would be forced to pay the price that 
we would disappear.” He continued, “Would I have been ready to 
use nuclear weapons? Yes, I would have agreed to the use of nuclear 
weapons.” And he added, “If Mr. McNamara or Mr. Kennedy had been 
in our place, and had their country been invaded, or their country 
was going to be occupied . . . I believe they would have used tactical 
nuclear weapons.” I hope that President Kennedy and I would not have 
behaved as Castro suggested we would have. . . . Had we responded 
in a similar way the damage to the United States would have been 
unthinkable. But human beings are fallible [emphasis added].35
This fascinating account shows how lack of information, mispercep-
tion, and ideology could have led to disaster if we had not been lucky. But 
false information, lack of information, and misperceptions were not the 
only reason why luck was the decisive cause of the positive outcome of 
the Cuban missile crisis. Limits of safety, limits of command and control, 
and organizational problems also have to be taken into account. As Scott 
Sagan wrote:
Many serious safety problems, which could have resulted in an acci-
dental or unauthorized detonation or a serious provocation to the 
Soviet government, occurred during the crisis. None of these inci-
dents led to inadvertent escalation or an accidental war. All of them, 
however, had the potential to do so. President Kennedy may well have 
35.  Robert S. McNamara, “Apocalypse Soon,” Foreign Policy 148 (May–June 2005): 33. 
Dean Acheson proposed this interpretation as early as 1969. He explained the posi-
tive outcome of the Cuban missile crisis as due to “plain dumb luck.” He explained 
the positive outcome in Esquire, February 1969, 76.
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been prudent. He did not, however, have unchallenged final control 
over U.S. nuclear weapons.36
Most-recent studies show that sloppy practices in nuclear weapons 
management have occurred at all levels of decision-makers, leaders, 
nuclear safety and security teams, and top-level military personnel in 
most nuclear-weapon states. They also show the limits of learning from 
past sloppy practices. Confidence in perfect nuclear safety is still a mat-
ter of wishing for the best and relying on luck.37 One telling example 
of this occurred at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota in 2007. This 
offers a well-documented case of multiple sloppy practices and suggests 
the limits of learning after the incident was identified. On August 29–30, 
2007, six US nuclear-armed cruise missile warheads were mistakenly 
flown to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. They had been placed by 
mistake under the wings of a B-52; the weapons had not been guarded 
appropriately during a thirty-six-hour period. Had the plane experienced 
any problems in flight, the crew would not have followed the proper 
emergency procedures.38 After this widely publicized case of sloppy 
36.  Sagan, The Limits of Safety, 116.
37.  Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus  
Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Allen Lane, 2013); and Patricia 
Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, and Sasan Aghlani, “Too Close for 
Comfort: Cases of near nuclear use and options for policy,” Chatham House, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2014, http://www.chathamhouse 
.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files 
/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf.
38.  This included jettisoning the cruise missiles if necessary. This involved sloppy prac-
tices at multiple levels. First, the original movement plan was changed and this 
change was not reported in the documents produced for the internal coordination 
process at Minot. “As a consequence, one of the originally scheduled pylons of 
cruise missiles had not been prepared for tactical ferry. [Second] When the breakout 
crew accessed the storage facility, they did not properly verify the status of the weap-
ons in the facility as required by established procedure and they failed to note that 
the missiles on one of the pylons on their internal work document still contained 
nuclear warheads. Although procedure requires three subsequent verifications (by 
GS_WarNotFought.indb   18 3/5/15   8:47 AM
A BET PORTRAYED AS A CERTAINTY  |  19
practices,39 US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates emphasized the need 
for responsibility in handling nuclear weapons: “The problems were the 
result of a long-standing slide in the Service’s nuclear stewardship. . . . For 
your part, you must never take your duties lightly. There is simply no room 
for error. Yours is the most sensitive mission in the entire US military.”40 
Change and improvement were supposed to follow, but even on the base 
where the incident took place and where the Secretary of Defense came 
to give his speech, it was necessary to repeat the order to leave no room 
for error. In April 2013, one officer from the 91st Missile Wing at the same 
Air Force Base in North Dakota was punished for sleeping on the job 
while having the blast door open behind him. (Sleeping wasn’t prohibited 
on a twenty-four-hour shift, but leaving the blast door open was.) He was 
one of two missile officers sanctioned that year for such a fault and he 
told his superiors that it wasn’t the first time.41 Air Force officers told the 
Associated Press that such violations of the safety procedures had hap-
pened more often than just in the two documented cases.42 The limits of 
safety, the limits of command and control, and the persistence of sloppy 
practices even in the US nuclear forces suggest that the role of luck is 
likely to have been even more important than we can document here. 
three different groups) of the payload installed in those cruise missiles, those proce-
dures were not followed.” The quotes for the account of this particular accident are 
taken from the unclassified account available in the February 2008 report from the 
Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, entitled 
Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons.
39.  George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn,  
“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008,  
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/publications/toward-a-nuclear-free-world.
40.  Global Security Newswire, “Gates stresses nuclear responsibility at Minot Air Force 
Base,” December 2, 2008, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/gates-stresses-nuclear 
-responsibility-at-minot-air-force-base/.
41.  Robert Burns, “Officers In Charge Of Nuclear Missiles Left Blast Door Open: Air 
Force Officials,” Associated Press, October 22, 2013. 
42.  Ibid.
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There are no reliable records of nuclear weapons accidents or close calls 
in most nuclear-weapon states.
Another reason why nuclear weapons cannot be considered as a nec-
essary and sufficient cause for peace among the great powers is that they 
have encouraged more risk-prone behavior which, in some cases, made 
war possible. In other words, nuclear deterrence can require leaders to 
get closer to the brink of disaster to make their deterrent threat more 
credible. “The most recent research has confirmed this argument and 
established that a significant deterrent effect against conventional con-
flict requires regional states to adopt an asymmetric escalation posture, 
which puts pressure on the command and control system and increases 
the risk of accidental use.”43 One case in which nuclear deterrence argu-
ably favored more risk-prone behavior is Kennedy’s strategy of deterrence 
in 1961. After Khrushchev’s ultimatum on Berlin, Kennedy hoped to deter 
him from escalating the crisis. So he emphasized, both privately and pub-
licly, US nuclear superiority and his willingness to conduct a nuclear first 
strike. The result was an increase in the tension between the two coun-
tries in the months leading to the Cuban missile crisis.44 Longer term, the 
strategies of deterrence developed by the two superpowers from the late 
1950s to October 1962 created a spiral of escalation in which the deploy-
ment of forces or their overestimation for the sake of deterrence led to an 
43.  Vipin Narang, “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and 
International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 3 (2012). 
44.  Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 2; see also Vojtech Mastny, “Introduction: 
new perspectives on the Cold War Alliance” and “Imagining War in Europe: Soviet 
Strategic Planning,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions 
in the East and West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas 
Wenger (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3, 38. A recent review of the historical evi-
dence on the Soviet side of the crisis is Sergey Radchenko, “The Cuban Missile 
 Crisis: Assessment of New, and Old, Russian Sources,” International Relations 26, 
no. 3 (September 2012).
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increased threat perception.45 It is interesting to note that this risk-prone 
behavior, caused partly by the strategy of nuclear deterrence, does not 
come only from a high risk perception. For instance, the crisis between 
the United States and the Soviet Union after the 1973 war in the Middle 
East was based on a low risk perception and faith in nuclear deterrence. 
Convinced that its adversary would not risk a nuclear escalation, each 
nation sought unilateral advantages that exacerbated the crisis.46
More importantly, a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence at the 
strategic level creates opportunities for low-intensity conflicts. Even worse 
than the 1973 Middle East confrontation was the Kargil crisis between 
India and Pakistan in 1999, which killed a thousand soldiers. The nuclear 
arsenals of both countries and the beliefs associated with them contributed 
to the crisis instead of preventing it. Contrary to the optimistic readings of 
the proponents of deterrence who focus on the fact that there was no esca-
lation47 or simply do not count it as a war,48 the Pakistani generals thought 
that their nuclear arsenal gave them the ability to send troops beyond 
the Indian border without risking retaliation from India.49 They were 
45.  Dominic D. P. Johnson, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive 
Illusions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), chap. 5; Richard Ned 
Lebow, “Conventional vs. Nuclear Deterrence: Are the Lessons Tranferable?” Journal 
of Social Issues 43, no. 4 (1987): 179.
46.  Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 10 and 13.
47.  Tertrais, “In defense of deterrence,” 9, note 5. 
48.  Scott Sagan and Alexander Montgomery focus on this fallacy and its effects in 
“The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 
(April 2009): 304, 321–322.
49.  S. Paul Kapur, “Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear 
instability: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe,” in Inside Nuclear 
South Asia, ed. Scott Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Timothy Hoyt, 
 “Kargil: the nuclear dimension,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes 
and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter Lavoy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 144.
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wrong, and war broke out.50 Before getting nuclear weapons, they had 
never attempted such an aggression.
The “long peace” was not that peaceful . . . a world without  
nuclear weapons will not be unprecedentedly war-prone
For nuclear deterrence advocates, the Cold War is portrayed as the “long 
peace” whereas a world without nuclear weapons would be war-prone. 
Both sides of this statement seem to be wildly exaggerated. On the one 
hand, the “long peace” was neither all that peaceful nor all that excep-
tional. It existed only in a limited space, and proxy wars killed several mil-
lion people during the Cold War.51 It was not that exceptional if defined 
as the avoidance of an all-out great-power war, which has been a pretty 
rare event.52 On the other hand, a world without nuclear weapons may 
well be much less war-prone than people assume. In a widely quoted 
article, Schelling wrote: “One can propose that another war on the scale 
of the 1940s is less to worry about than anything nuclear. But it might 
give pause to reflect that the world of 1939 was utterly free of nuclear 
50.  S. Paul Kapur shows that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan increased the fre-
quency and intensity of conflicts between the two countries. See Kapur, Dangerous 
Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford: 
 Stanford University Press, 2007), 122–127; Kapur, this volume. For a contrarian posi-
tion and Kapur’s defense, see Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and 
the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010).
51.  Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Cold War studies 
are partly responsible for maintaining this illusion of the long peace. As Holger 
 Nehring notes: “While attracting attention from many different fields and profiting 
from interdisciplinary inspiration, Cold War studies . . . might have lost sight of 
one of the key elements of the ‘Cold War’: its war-like character.” See Nehring, 
“What Was the Cold War?” English Historical Review 127, no. 527 (August 2012): 
923, 925. 
52.  Randolph M. Siverson and Michael D. Ward, “The Long Peace: A Reconsideration,” 
International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002). 
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weapons, yet they were not only produced, they were invented, during 
war itself and used with devastating effect.”53
There are at least three counter-arguments to the idea of a radical con-
trast between the “long nuclear peace” and a war-prone world without 
nuclear weapons.
The first: yes, abolishing nuclear weapons is not abolishing war. 
However, the ability to reconstitute nuclear weapons would create a “vir-
tual deterrent” effect.54 Moreover, in a world without nuclear weapons, the 
support for measures to prevent or respond to a breakout would, arguably, 
be much greater than it is today.55 Leaders in this world would probably 
remember Schelling’s story and learn from it. As Sagan said, “In a nuclear- 
free world, the former nuclear-weapons states would have far stronger 
mutual incentives to punish and reverse any new state’s decision to 
acquire atomic bombs. Ironically, it is precisely because nuclear- weapons 
states have such large arsenals today that they sometimes succumb to the 
temptation to accept new proliferators. In a disarmed world, such com-
placency would be more obviously imprudent.”56
The second counter-argument is included in the quote of Schelling’s 
work: yes, another war of the size of 1940 is less to worry about than 
anything nuclear. This is because of the speed of the destruction caused 
by a nuclear war, which would be much more difficult to stop if it ever 
53.  Thomas C. Schelling, “A World without Nuclear Weapons?” Daedalus 138, no. 4 
(Fall 2009): 125, 127.
54.  The original idea of “virtual arsenals” or “weaponless deterrence” comes from 
Jonathan Schell in his book The Abolition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). See 
also Sidney D. Drell and Raymond Jeanloz, “Nuclear Deterrence in a World without 
Nuclear Weapons”; and Christopher A. Ford, “Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and 
its Discontents: Challenges of ‘Weaponless Deterrence’” and David Holloway, 
“Deterrence and Enforcement in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” in Deterrence: 
Its Past and Future.
55.  Holloway, “Deterrence and Enforcement,” 342; and Sagan, “The Great Debate,” 90.
56.  Sagan, “The Great Debate,” 90.
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started, and of the duration of the radiation effects that would follow the 
war if anyone survived.
The third counter-argument would be that a world without nuclear 
weapons will not be achieved overnight, so changes that would happen 
between now and then need to be considered. One is a macro-trend 
toward a steady decline in the number of armed conflicts between states, 
at least since 1945, a trend that became stronger after 1989.57 Then comes 
the “Norman Angell rebuttal,”58 suggesting that four years before the most 
destructive war man had ever experienced, theoreticians also saw the 
end of war and an increase in economic interdependence that was sup-
posed to make war too costly. It is also true that the idea of the changing 
character of war has appeared every one or two generations in the last 
two centuries.59 However, the trend is observed by most analysts even if 
they disagree on the causes.60 Another interesting trend is the recognition 
that UN peace-keeping operations are more successful than previously 
57.  John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990); Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of 
Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Dutton Books, 2011); Steven Pinker, The 
Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011); 
Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christopher J. Fettweis, Dangerous Times? 
The International Politics of Great Power Peace (Washington, DC:  Georgetown 
University Press, 2009); Azar Gat, “The Changing Character of War,” in The 
Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 44; John Horgan, The End of War (New York: McSweeney’s, 
2012),133–137.
58.  Norman Angell was an English journalist and Labor Member of Parliament who 
argued in 1909 that a major war would be futile and would not pay, due to major 
economic interdependence among nations. His book, Europe’s Optical Illusion, was 
republished in 1910 under the title The Great Illusion: A Study of Military Power and 
National Advantage (London: G. P. Putnam’s sons, 1910) and often retrospectively 
portrayed as claiming that World War I was impossible.
59.  Gat, “The Changing Character of War,” 27.
60.  The declining trend in the frequency of war among great powers is still visible if 
you shift the threshold for war from the standard one thousand battle deaths to 
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thought and rather inexpensive.61 These are obviously not irreversible—
the fear that climate change would reverse this trend and create wars has 
been expressed widely62 as well as fear of a war in the Taiwan strait63—
but they suggest policies to keep this trend downward.
Nuclear proliferation risks are not likely to increase  
if the size of the US nuclear arsenal decreases64
The second key critique of the goal of a world without nuclear weap-
ons is based on the idea that positive nuclear security guarantees, or the 
so-called “nuclear umbrellas,” are necessary to prevent proliferation. 
Therefore, shrinking the size of the US arsenal would simply decrease the 
credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and, thus, create additional 
incentives for nuclear proliferation.65 If so, getting to zero might not be 
achievable or desirable, as it would spur proliferation.
twenty-five. Andrew Mack, roundtable on Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of our 
Nature, ISA, San Diego, Calif., April 3, 2012.
61.  Goldstein, Winning the War on War; interview of the author with Joshua S. Goldstein, 
San Diego, April 4, 2012. He observed that every US household pays $700 a month 
to fund the military, including pensions, and only $2 a month for UN peacekeepers, 
who are chronically underfunded and suffer from a lack of resources.
62.  A famous voice is Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 82–83.
63.  Lebow, Why Nations Fight, 223.
64.  Some of the arguments in this section will also appear in Benoît Pelopidas, “The 
Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nonproliferation,” 
in The Future of US Extended Deterrence: NATO and Beyond, ed. Stéfanie von 
Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
 forthcoming 2015).
65.  Here, by credibility, I mean credibility in the eyes of the protégé/ally and those of the 
potential attacker. I ignore the technical issue of stockpile reliability as well as that of 
the confidence of US policymakers in that reliability. On these issues, see Benjamin 
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The idea that extended nuclear deterrence deters proliferation has 
been stated in official US policy documents even before the 2001 Nuclear 
Posture Review66 and has been US official policy at least since then. In 
December 2008, the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on 
DoD Nuclear Weapons Management stated, “The United States has 
extended its nuclear protective umbrella to 30-plus friends and allies as 
an expression of commitment and common purpose as well as a disin-
centive for proliferation.”67 On page 7, this report also quotes the 1998 
annual defense report stating that “Nuclear forces remain an important 
disincentive to nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation.” The same 
idea is expressed in a May 2009 report requested by Congress: “During 
the Cold War, proliferation was strongly inhibited by the relationships of 
extended deterrence established by the United States (and also by the 
Soviet Union).”68 The May 2009 report to Congress also states that:
[The United States] must continue to safeguard the interests of its 
allies as it does so. Their assurance that extended deterrence remains 
credible and effective may require that the United States retain 
Sims and Christopher R. Henke, “Repairing Credibility: Repositioning nuclear weap-
ons knowledge after the Cold War,” Social Studies of Science 42, no. 3 (June 2012). 
66.  In a comment on the Nuclear Posture Review he has heavily influenced, Keith 
Payne wrote: “[The United States] extended nuclear deterrence commitments—
it nuclear umbrella—permit friends and allies to forgo seeking their own indepen-
dent nuclear capabilities or alternatives. This is perhaps the single most important 
inhibitor of the pace of global proliferation today.” Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear 
 Posture Review:  Setting the Record Straight,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 
( Summer 2005): 148.
67.  US Department of Defense, “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, 
2008,” iv. 
68.  United States Institute of Peace, America’s Strategic Posture. The Final Report of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), 8. 
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numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem nec-
essary if it were concerned only with its own defense.
This idea was expressed quite clearly in a Council on Foreign Relations 
April 2009 report entitled US Nuclear Policy:
Although the United States does not need nuclear weapons to com-
pensate for conventional military weaknesses, other states are not in 
a similar position—they may consider acquiring nuclear weapons to 
deter attacks. The United States has the responsibility to assure allies 
through extended deterrence commitments. This assurance helps con-
vince many of these allies not to acquire their own nuclear weap-
ons. . . . A related pillar, necessary to maintain the credibility of the U.S.  
nuclear deterrent for as long as it is needed, is to ensure that the  
U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure and reliable.69
The text of the Nuclear Posture Review restates the same two argu-
ments about the role of extended nuclear deterrence—it is meant to reas-
sure allies and in the process deter proliferation:
The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile 
consistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies. . . . 
By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, . . . we can reassure our 
non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commit-
ments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons 
capabilities of their own.70
This argument persists because people generalize from a few cases in 
which a positive nuclear security guarantee actually played a role in the 
69.  Council on Foreign Relations, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2009: 5. These points 
are reaffirmed on pages 8, 14–16, 81, 90–91.
70.  Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010: 39, 7. 
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decision not to go for the bomb—Germany, Japan71—and because it has 
not received the careful historical analysis it deserves.72
As a critique of this argument, I propose three points:
1. The idea that a decrease in the size of the US nuclear arsenal 
will lead to a wave of proliferation wrongly assumes the 
existence of a pressing desire for the bomb waiting for more 
favorable conditions. This expectation has been proven wrong 
for several decades.
2. An extended nuclear deterrence guarantee has historically not 
been a necessary condition for states to give up nuclear-weapon 
ambitions.
3. The existing studies fail to isolate the role of nuclear weapons 
among other factors in the security guarantee they discuss. As a 
consequence, they underestimate the credibility problem of 
extended nuclear deterrence and overestimate the demand for 
such a nuclear guarantee, which has been perceived as more 
threatening than reassuring in important cases.
At the state level, the present and foreseeable demand 
for nuclear weapons is limited
The argument that without a credible nuclear security guarantee states 
would have additional incentives to develop their nuclear arsenals 
71.  Daniel Deudney explicitly focuses on these two cases when he makes the argument 
that the extended nuclear deterrence commitment played a major role in non- 
proliferation decisions. See Daniel Deudney, “Unipolarity and nuclear weapons,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, ed. G. John 
Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 305, 307.
72.  David Holloway notes this lack of historical analysis of the role of extended deter-
rence in what he calls “the proliferation objection” to a world without nuclear weap-
ons in “Deterrence and Enforcement,” 353, note 19.
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assumes an implicit desire to go for the bomb. It suffers from what I call 
the nuclear straitjacket. In this perspective, the ultimate security guarantor 
has to be nuclear. This approach neglects the possibility of a non-nuclear 
understanding of security. This is a strong bias given that the most gener-
ous estimate of the number of states that have ever had nuclear-weapon- 
related activities totals only forty.73 Most states, as a matter of fact, have 
never expressed any interest in developing nuclear weapons even if aca-
demic and governmental forecasts have announced cascades of prolifer-
ation at least since the late 1950s.74 Moreover, among those states that 
have had any form of nuclear-weapons-related activities, more have given 
up before or after building a nuclear arsenal (twenty-nine) than have kept 
their arsenals (nine).75 It is worth noting that two recent authoritative 
analyses reject the idea of a wave of proliferation following the possible 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran.76 Moreover, recent studies of the 
management of nuclear-weapons programs show that, contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, the rate of failure has increased over time and the time 
73.  Details about these numbers can be found in Benoît Pelopidas, “The Oracles of 
 Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy 
Innovation,” Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (March 2011). Forty is the most pessi-
mistic estimate of nuclear-weapons-related activities. See http://thenuclearworld 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Benoit_Pelopidas_oracles_of_proliferation 
_NPR2011-3.pdf.
74.  Ibid.
75.  Ibid., 306. (To add up to forty, the list would have to include Iran and Syria.)
76.  William Potter, with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Prolifera-
tion in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, Volume 2 (Stanford, CA: 
 Stanford University Press, 2010); James J. Wirtz and Peter Lavoy, eds., Over the 
Horizon Proliferation Threats (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). These 
two books cover Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, 
Ukraine, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, 
and Vietnam. In the most recent of these two studies, only one case, Saudi Arabia, 
is considered as very likely to go for the bomb. See James Russell, “Nuclear Prolif-
eration and the Middle East’s Security Dilemma: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” in Over 
the Horizon Proliferation Threats.
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needed to lead a nuclear-weapon program to completion has increased.77 
So the idea that decreasing the size of the US nuclear arsenal would 
create additional incentives for proliferation underestimates important 
factors: the lack of desire for these weapons in the first place and the 
frequency of nuclear reversal in midcourse, on top of the managerial and 
technological obstacles to developing a nuclear-weapon program, which 
remain very strong.
Extended nuclear deterrence has neither been necessary 
nor sufficient to deter proliferation
A positive nuclear security guarantee has not been a necessary or suffi-
cient condition for all states to give up nuclear weapons ambitions. In 
other words, some states have given up nuclear weapons plans despite 
the lack of a positive nuclear security guarantee or “nuclear umbrella” 
(South Africa, Libya, Ukraine, Sweden78 and all the states that had not 
77.  Jacques Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Prolifera-
tion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
78.  Analysts reluctant to consider Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as nuclear-weapon 
possessors focus on the issues of launch codes, satellites, and testing. Here, I will 
focus on Ukraine as an example. To be considered as possessing a nuclear arsenal, 
Ukraine would have needed access to the launch codes for its missiles and would 
have had to become able to change the targets of that same arsenal. The experts I 
met agreed that the Ukrainians could have obtained the codes had they been 
given enough time. (Interview with Robert Nurick, Washington, DC, April 4, 2008; 
interview with Nikolai Sokov, Monterey, Calif., November 13, 2009.) James 
E. Goodby mentions a “strong presumption that if [Ukraine] chose to keep the 
nuclear weapons within its borders, it could have done so.” See “Preventive Diplo-
macy for Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union,” in Opportunities 
Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World,  
ed. Bruce W. Jentleson (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 110. It is true that 
Ukraine had neither an independent satellite system to monitor missiles nor a testing 
site, yet Christopher Stevens argues that nuclear warheads would have remained via-
ble without testing until at least 2010, whereupon computerized tests could have 
been carried out. See Christopher Stevens, “Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarma-
ment: The Case of Ukraine,” Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 1 (March 2008). He 
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expressed interest in developing these weapons in the first place) while 
others have developed nuclear weapons in spite of a nuclear security 
guarantee (France and Great Britain).79
It is true that Ukraine and Libya received some form of security assur-
ances but, in spite of what the Ukrainian leadership said for domestic pur-
poses, the security assurances Ukraine received from Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States on December 5, 1994, are nowhere close 
to a promise of extended nuclear deterrence and were ignored by Russia 
in 2014.80 Moreover, the results of recent research across cases are con-
tradictory and do not allow us to conclude that any strong relationship 
exists between a positive nuclear security guarantee and national nuclear- 
weapons decisions.81
also points out that US and Russian experts believed that the Ukrainians had the 
capacity required to ensure the security of nuclear warheads.
79.  The complete analysis of those two early cases and their relevance can be found in 
Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket.”
80.  The memorandum and an analysis of the negotiation can be found in Goodby, 
“Preventive Diplomacy for Nuclear Nonproliferation,” 123–126 and 128–129. 
[See footnote 78.]
81.  The key insights of this body of literature are the inconsistency of the results, the lack 
of statistically significant correlation between the relationship with a nuclear-armed 
state and nuclear-weapons-related behavior, and the skepticism of qualitative case 
studies regarding such a connection. Some studies suggest that a security guarantee 
offered by a nuclear-armed power has only a limited effect on a state’s decision to 
explore a nuclear weapons option. See Philipp C. Bleek, “Why do states proliferate? 
Quantitative analysis of the exploration, pursuit, and acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1, The Role of 
Theory, ed. William Potter, with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), 179–180; Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, “Determinants 
of nuclear weapons proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007); 
 Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, “The correlates of nuclear proliferation: a quanti-
tative test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (December 2004). After rectifying 
a methodological problem in Singh and Way, Sagan and Montgomery show that their 
result was not statistically significant, in “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation.” 
 However, Sagan is right to object that these results might be due to selection effects 
in “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science 14  
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The counter-argument would be to say that even if these conditions 
were not necessary across cases, it is enough if they were decisive in a 
few key cases, like Germany and Japan. It is true that German rearma-
ment was a key concern in the post-World War II years and the Germans 
were suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. Similarly, after the end of the 
Cold War, the same fear reemerged and the German chancellor Helmut 
Kohl gave credit to what I called the nuclear straitjacket. He explained 
that Germany would not develop its own nuclear weapons because it 
trusted the US “nuclear umbrella.”82 We are therefore expected to think 
that extended nuclear deterrence kept Germany from going nuclear in 
the past and the same is supposed to be true for Japan, whose officials 
(June 2011): 233. Other studies suggest opposite results and argue that pacts with 
nuclear-armed states would increase the risk of proliferation rather than decrease it. 
See, for example, Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little-Known Story of 
Deproliferation: Why States Give up Nuclear Weapons Activities,” in Forecasting 
Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory. But even in this case, 
the authors recognize that the link is only weak. This is in line with the skepticism 
of the qualitative literature regarding this type of correlation. Etel Solingen insists on 
the weakness of the correlation between positive nuclear security guarantees and 
nonproliferation and Jacques Hymans and T. V. Paul emphasize the variation in the 
effects of alliances on nuclear proliferation decisions from one case to the other. See 
Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 12–14, 25–27, 256; Jacques 
Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42–43, note 79; 
T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: 
McGill Queens University Press, 2000), 53–154. Only Maria Rublee offers a more 
favorable analysis of positive nuclear security guarantees. She argues that if there is 
internal debate, such guarantees can be decisive and convince the supporters of an 
independent nuclear-weapon capability. See Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation 
Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: Georgia University Press, 
2009), 202–203. However, even she does not argue for a systematic effect across 
cases. A good systematic review of this subset of literature can be found in Jeffrey 
W. Knopf, “Varieties of Assurance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (2012): 
389–394.
82.  Interview with Helmut Kohl, Le Figaro, May 6–7, 1992. 
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emphasize so strongly the nuclear component of the alliance.83 It cer-
tainly played a role, but it is necessary to keep in mind that, first, it is hard 
to discern how policies were affected exclusively by the nuclear compo-
nent of the security guarantee and, second, the utility of future nuclear 
options may be seen in a different light than they were in the past. [See 
chapters 13 and 14 in this volume regarding Korea and Japan.]
For example, the most detailed study on the German case argues that 
German nuclear policy decisions were not determined primarily by con-
cerns about extended deterrence but rather about its foreign policy situ-
ation in NATO. For Bonn, showing that it was able to exercise a nuclear 
option was an opportunity for influence within NATO.84 Decades later, 
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has affected German perceptions of 
appropriate behavior and the Fukushima nuclear accident has crystal-
lized the progress of an anti-nuclear culture which has played a strong 
role in German nuclear policy after the Cold War.85 Similarly, in the case 
of Japan, the nuclear security guarantee appears as a necessary but not 
sufficient cause for nonproliferation.86
83.  The Taiwanese and South Korean rollbacks are better explained by other variables. 
See Solingen, Nuclear Logics.
84.  Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1975). Matthias Küntzel agrees that the purpose of 
Germany’s policy was to reach a threshold status and to keep a nuclear weapons 
option open in Bonn and the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option (Lon-
don: Pluto Press, 1995). There is disagreement on this issue though, and Beatrice 
Heuser makes the case for what I called the nuclear straitjacket in the German case, 
at least until Bonn signed the NPT. She argues that short of national nuclear forces, 
the German leadership advocated a NATO nuclear force and/or a European one. See 
Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces 
for Europe 1949–2000 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 125–126.
85.  Harald Müller, “Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefini-
tion,” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, report 55, 2000: 10; Tom Sauer and Bob 
van der Zwaan, “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon 
 Summit: Why their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible,” International Relations 26, 
no. 1 (March 2012): 88–89.
86.  Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 96.
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So the nuclear security guarantee cannot be judged to have been a 
necessary or sufficient condition for nonproliferation across cases. Even 
when it played a role, the coupling of deterrence with nuclear weapons 
makes it hard to separate out what that role was.
The coupling of extended deterrence and nuclear weapons 
overestimates the role of these weapons in nonproliferation policy
The assessments of extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation 
tool analyze the value of the nuclear component as a subset of the total 
value of the security guarantee that is offered. This leads to overstating 
the role of nuclear weapons in nonproliferation policy in two ways: 
(1) every security guarantee offered by a nuclear-armed state is implic-
itly considered as a nuclear security guarantee,87 neglecting the central 
problem of credibility that plagues extended nuclear deterrence; and 
(2) the demand for nuclear security guarantees on the part of the protégé 
is mischaracterized.
Extended nuclear deterrence suffers from a basic credibility problem.88 
Its advantage vis-à-vis deterrence by conventional means comes from the 
higher level of anticipated damage if the nuclear threat is executed, but 
the credibility of this threat is dubious since its aim is to protect an ally 
and not necessarily the homeland of the protecting state. The tradition of 
87.  On the inability of most studies to conceive of a non-nuclear security strategy as 
purposive and deliberate as opposed to a default option, see Benoît Pelopidas, 
“Reversal and Restraint,” in Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy, ed. 
Nathan Busch and Joseph F. Pilat (London: Routledge, 2015). The biased premise 
and the conclusion it necessarily leads to are condensed in the following sentence 
by Bruno Tertrais: “Security guarantees by a nuclear-armed state, potentially 
involving the use of nuclear weapons to protect an ally, have played an important 
role in preventing proliferation.” See Tertrais, “Security Assurances and the Future 
of Proliferation,” in Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats, 240.
88.  Timothy W. Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, 
and Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global 
Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009).
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non-use of nuclear weapons makes this lack of credibility more of a fact 
every day.89 This credibility deficit is best captured by the words of Henry 
Kissinger, who confessed at a meeting of American and European defense 
experts that, as national security adviser and secretary of state, he had 
often repeated the promise of extended deterrence to NATO allies. Then, 
he added:
If my analysis is correct, these words cannot be true. And we must 
face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the 
credibility of the threat of mutual suicide. Therefore, I would say—
which I might not say in office—the European allies should not keep 
asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly 
mean, or, if we do mean, we would not want to execute, because if 
we execute we risk the destruction of civilization.90
Even if this statement has a specific purpose and has to be understood 
in context, it is a candid acknowledgement of the credibility problem of 
extended nuclear deterrence: the protector who pretends to use nuclear 
weapons to protect an ally either does not mean what he says or, if he 
means it, will not want to keep his promise when the time comes because 
it is too risky. In the end, the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence 
pledges never seems to be credible enough to dissuade those nations that 
decided to go for the bomb from doing so.
Beyond the underestimation of the credibility problem, the need for 
extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation tool is overestimated 
because analysts misunderstand the demand for positive nuclear security 
89.  For an argument about the role of the taboo in decreasing the credibility of 
extended deterrence pledges, see George Perkovich, “Extended Deterrence on the 
Way to a Nuclear-Free World,” paper for the International Commission on Nuclear 
Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009, http://icnnd.org/Documents 
/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf. 
90.  Henry A. Kissinger, “The Future of NATO,” Washington Quarterly 2, no. 4 
(Autumn 1979).
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guarantees: they assume that such a demand does exist on the part of the 
protégé and that it will not coexist with an independent deterrent. None 
of these claims is supported by the historical record.
There have been numerous cases in which the presence of such a guar-
antee in the form of nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil was per-
ceived as more threatening than protecting. The type of security guarantee 
that is requested is not necessarily of a nuclear nature and pretending to 
offer a “nuclear umbrella” can be counterproductive.91 Good examples of 
a rather widespread fear would be Norway and Libya.
As a NATO member since 1954, Norway benefits from a nuclear 
umbrella. However, in December 1957, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen 
unexpectedly announced at a NATO summit in Paris that his country 
would not accept the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons on 
its soil in peacetime.92 By doing so, the prime minister avoided turning 
his country into a target of Soviet nuclear forces. Before speaking at the 
NATO summit, he had assured the Soviet Union that Norway would not 
authorize American troops to supervise nuclear charges on its soil.93 This 
fear is not unique. In the early days of the Cold War, when British Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee was informed that if nuclear weapons had to be 
91.  One critical problem here is that positive and negative assurances can be in tension 
since the efforts to increase the credibility of the pledge of extended nuclear deter-
rence require affirmation of a readiness to use them, which is contradictory to the 
idea of negative security assurances. Bruno Tertrais shows it well in “Security Assur-
ances and the Future of Proliferation.” See also Knopf, “Varieties of Assurance,” 
388–389.
92.  When they decided to be among the founding members of NATO, Norwegian 
authorities also made clear that they would not accept permanent basing of foreign 
forces on their soil either. Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations 
in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 217. 
93.  Astrid Forland, “Norway’s Nuclear Odyssey: From Optimistic Proponent to Nonpro-
liferator,” Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 12–14.
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used against the Soviet Union, they would be launched from British terri-
tory, he tried to convince President Truman to do otherwise.94
As for Libya, it should have been a perfect case for the nuclear 
 straitjacket—either an independent national deterrent or an extended 
nuclear security guarantee—given the length of the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons by Colonel Moammar Gadhafi95 and the fact that his life had 
been threatened by the United States.96 The current historical knowledge 
about the Libyan case suggests, however, that Tripoli received no pos-
itive nuclear security guarantee. It is true that it received two security 
guarantees from those with whom it negotiated the dismantlement of its 
so-called weapons of mass destruction program, none of which had any-
thing to do with extended nuclear deterrence. The first one was offered 
during negotiations around the settlement of the Lockerbie case in the late 
94.  Nicholas Wheeler, “The Attlee Government’s Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1951,” in 
Britain and the First Cold War, ed. Anne Deighton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1990). Such a fear and opposition to a “nuclear umbrella” can be found in 
Sweden and New Zealand. 
95.  Gadhafi started the nuclear-weapons program only a few months after taking power 
in 1969 and ended it in 2003. See Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 152; Solingen, 
Nuclear Logics, 213, 215; Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Libya’s Nuclear Turnaround: 
Perspectives from Tripoli,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 59–61; 
Harald Müller, “The Exceptional End to the Extraordinary Libyan Nuclear Quest,” in 
Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, ed. Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre 
Lodgaard (London: Routledge, 2007), 78; Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear 
Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
52; David Albright, Peddling Peril: How Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s 
Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), 49; William Langewiesche, The Atomic 
Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor (New York: Penguin, 2007), 171.
96.  The operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986 can be considered as at attempt at killing 
the Libyan leader given the amount of effort to determine where he would spend the 
night the evening before the attack. Leif Mollo, The United States and Assassination 
Policy: Diluting the Absolute, MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 
December 2003: 15–16 ; Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction, Norms and Force 
in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 75–77; and 
Pelopidas, Renoncer à l’arme nucléaire, 216–220.
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1990s.97 It consisted in implicitly assuring the Gadhafi regime that it was 
not under threat. The second one was not formalized before June 2006. 
That was more than two and a half years after Libya officially announced 
it had given up on nuclear weapons, even if one could argue that the 
discussions on the terms of this letter started just before the official 
announcement.98 In this letter, signed by the British and then the Libyan 
authorities, London committed itself to help satisfy Tripoli’s needs in terms 
of conventional defense and to actively seek an action from the United 
Nations Security Council if Libya were attacked by biological or chemical 
weapons.99 Neither of these guarantees can be presented as a positive 
nuclear security guarantee. The only nuclear component of these dec-
larations reaffirms the negative security guarantee the United Kingdom 
provided to the non-nuclear NPT member states in April 1995.
This does not mean that security considerations did not contribute to 
Libya’s decision to give up nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon pro-
grams. The security considerations were focused on regime survival.100 
Gadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam was explicit about the need for security guar-
antees, but focused on the conventional level. In 2004, he reported the 
commitments of the United States and the United Kingdom in the fol-
lowing terms: “They said we, the West, and the international society will 
 97.  On December 21, 1988, a bomb was detonated on board Pan Am flight 103 from 
Frankfurt to Detroit and parts of the plane crashed onto Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 
more than 270 people. After a two-year investigation, an arrest warrant was issued 
for two Libyan nationals. 
 98.  Wyn Q. Bowen, “Libya, nuclear rollback and the role of negative and positive secu-
rity assurances,” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 12.
 99.  Ibid., 1.
100.  Braut-Hegghammer, “Libya’s Nuclear Turnaround,” 71; Bowen, “Libya, nuclear 
rollback and the role of negative and positive security assurances,” 9–11; Bruce 
Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy 
Debate and its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security 30, no. 3 
(Winter 2005–2006): 56, 74; Harald Müller, “The Exceptional End to the 
Extraordinary Libyan Nuclear Quest,” 88-89; Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 216.
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be responsible for the protection of Libya” and will provide “necessary 
defensive weapons.”101
Not only does the nuclear straitjacket wrongly assume that demand for 
a positive nuclear security guarantee exists—it also falls into the opposite 
trap of neglecting that such a demand can coexist in various ways with 
a national nuclear-weapon program. For example, it fails to capture the 
thinking of decision-makers in France and the United Kingdom when their 
nuclear-weapons programs were developed.102 In both cases, the leaders 
never thought their choice was either a national nuclear-weapons capabil-
ity or a positive nuclear security; they contemplated combinations of both.
Non-democratic leaders can give up nuclear weapons  
for regime survival
The third recurring critique of the goal of a world without nuclear- weapons 
states is that it is not feasible because states with relatively weak con-
ventional arsenals will never give up their nuclear arsenals.103 A  specific 
101.  Carla Ann Robbins, “In giving up arms, Libya hopes to gain new economic life,” 
Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004.
102.  Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket.”
103.  The three cases would be Israel, France, and Pakistan. A chapter is dedicated to 
each country in Barry Blechman and Alexander Bollfrass, eds., National Perspec-
tives on Nuclear Disarmament (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010). 
See also Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity, and the Vision of 
Global Zero,” and Venance Journé, “France’s Nuclear Stance: Independence, Uni-
lateralism, and Adaptation,” in Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament, 
ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010); and Devin T. Hagerty, “The Nuclear Holdouts: India, Israel, and Paki-
stan,” in Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2012); James M. Acton, Deterrence during Disarmament: Deep 
Nuclear Reductions and International Security (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011); 
Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Somerville, and Andrea Berger, eds., Small Nuclear 
Forces: Five Perspectives (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011).
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version of this argument is used as the scarecrow intended to stop the 
 conversation about the goal of a world without nuclear weapons: dicta-
tors with nuclear weapons will never give them up. This section will assess 
this particular critique. The most frequently quoted supporting evidence 
for this argument is that dictators have learned the lesson from Libya. 
On December 19, 2003, President George W. Bush officially welcomed 
Colonel Gadhafi’s decision to give up weapons of mass destruction with 
the following words:
Today in Tripoli, the leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar al- Gaddafi, 
publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all 
weapons of mass destruction programs in his country. . . . And another 
message should be equally clear: leaders who abandon the pursuit of 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver 
them, will find an open path to better relations with the United States 
and other free nations.  .  .  . As the Libyan government takes these 
essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness, its good faith will be 
returned. Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the 
nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United 
States. . . . Old hostilities do not need to go on forever.104
The so-called WMD programs were dismantled with the help of the 
United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.105 Less than ten years 
104.  BBC News, transcript of President George Bush’s statement in Washington on 
Libya’s dismantling of WMD, December 20, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/americas/3336159.stm. 
105.  Jack Boureston and Yana Feldman, “Verifying Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament,” Trust 
& Verify 112, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, London, 2004; 
Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2005). One has to recognize that his long quest for nuclear 
weapons had led to very little success. For a summary of the Libyan program’s fail-
ures and shortcomings, see Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 239–243. How-
ever, I argued elsewhere that these were not enough to pretend that Libya was not a 
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later, members of the armed forces of the National Transition Council 
captured Gadhafi and beat him to death after his convoy was bombed by 
NATO forces. Many constituencies of the nuclear conversation seem to 
have learned the same lesson from this episode: if you are not a US ally, 
keep your nuclear weapons or get a few quickly. Otherwise, your survival 
as a ruler is not assured. Pundits and proliferation analysts, civilian and 
military alike, have publicly expressed this lesson from the Libyan story.106 
The efforts by US officials to disconnect Libyan disarmament from the fall 
of the Gadhafi regime did not convince observers.107 The North Koreans 
were the first ones to express skepticism publicly. “The situation in Libya 
is a lesson for the international community,” said a spokesman for the 
North Korean Foreign Ministry, unnamed by the North’s news agency. 
“It has been shown to the corners of the earth that Libya’s giving up its 
nuclear arms, which the US liked to chatter on about, was used as an 
invasion tactic to disarm the country. . . . Having one’s own strengths was 
the only way to keep the peace.”108 This is not an isolated statement. Iran’s 
religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, addressing the population for 
serious proliferator: it did not give up when the sanctions and the technological 
impediments were the strongest. See Pelopidas, Renoncer à l’arme nucléaire.
106.  Among others, see Andrew J. Pierre, “If Gaddafi Had The Bomb,” Huffington Post, 
August 4, 2011; Waltz, “The Great Debate,” 92. Kenneth N. Waltz and Mira 
Rapp-Hopper, “What Kim Jong-Il Learned from Qaddafi’s Fall: Never Disarm,” The 
Atlantic, October 24, 2011; Gus Lubin, “Why The Libyan War Means That No 
Country Will Ever Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons Again,” Business Insider, March 24, 
2011; Norman Cigar, “Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons and Implications for 
Nuclear Proliferation,” US Marine Corps University, Middle East Studies  
(January 2012): 12–13. 
107.  “Where they’re at today has absolutely no connection with them renouncing their 
nuclear program or nuclear weapons,” said Mark Toner, a State Department spokes-
man, in March 2011. Quoted in Mark McDonald, “North Korea Suggests Libya 
Should Have Kept Nuclear Program,” New York Times, March 24, 2011.
108.  Korea JoongAng Daily, “Libyans should have kept nukes, says Pyongyang,” 
March 24, 2011, http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article 
.aspx?aid=2933884. 
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the Persian New Year, said that Gadhafi’s concessions to the West over 
Libya’s nuclear program showed that Iran was right to continue to reject 
any curb to its nuclear development.109 As Norman Cigar wrote in a paper 
for the US Marine Corps University, “The sense of legitimacy of a coun-
try’s previous acquisition of nuclear weapons or its efforts to do so will 
increase, in part thanks to a more understanding environment, especially 
among countries with similar concerns.”110
Advocates for a world without nuclear weapons seem to face a conun-
drum. The end goal becomes impossible to achieve because no dictator 
will ever give up nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should not be desired. It 
is true that the United States has never attacked a nuclear-armed adver-
sary to overthrow its regime and only one nuclear-armed state has suf-
fered military attacks aiming at least at changing the regime: Israel.111
109.  Robin Pomeroy, “Don’t Bomb Libya, Arm Rebels, Says Iran’s Khamenei,” Reuters, 
March 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-iran-khamenei 
-idUSTRE72K50L20110321.
110.  Cigar, “Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament,” 13.
111.  In 1973, it was well-known that Israel had developed such a capability but Egypt 
and Syria attacked anyway. Other cases would be Argentina invading the British 
Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Iraqi attack on Israel in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
But the goal was never to overthrow the regime in the United Kingdom or in Israel. 
It was only to regain territory. See Berry et al., “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons,” 
26–27; Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 145. It is tempting to 
mention the 1967 war as a precedent given that Israel had assembled a crude 
nuclear device in the run-up to the war (Avner Cohen, “Crossing the Threshold: 
The Untold Nuclear Dimension of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Its Contemporary 
Lessons,” Arms Control Today 37, June 2007) and that the goal of the Arab 
coalition might have been to overthrow the regime in Israel. The rhetoric on the 
Egyptian radio on the eve of the conflict was challenging the Israeli leader Levi 
Eshkol and suggesting that opening fire would lead to the “death and annihilation 
of Israel.” See Pierre Hazan, 1967, la guerre des six jours: la victoire empoisonnée 
(1967, the six-day war: the poisoned victory) (Paris: Complexe, 2001), 18. 
However, the Egyptian leadership at the time was not aware of the Israeli capability. 
See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998), 259–276.
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Noting that dictators can change their minds and calculations about 
the utility of nuclear weapons even after pursuing these weapons for 
decades112 is important but not sufficient, since we only have a few cases 
of renunciation of an existing arsenal. It is worth focusing on the supposed 
worst-case scenario of a dictator keeping nuclear weapons while other 
states have disarmed. To reassess this scenario, I will make two points: 
first, nuclear weapons do not protect against coups and popular uprisings; 
and second, the incentives to denuclearize would be enormous because 
of the combined pressures of global norms, big-power opposition, eco-
nomic sanctions, and powerful conventional forces arrayed against the 
holdout.
112.  Moammar Gadhafi was the case in point. It is true that the Libyan regime did not 
achieve much in terms of nuclear technology. However, the focus on technolog-
ical failure does not account for the timing of Gadhafi’s decision to disarm. 
Given that he started a nuclear-weapon program as soon as he took power in 
1969 and did not make significant progress, why suddenly give up in 2003? 
Sanctions tell only part of the story: they had asphyxiated the country since the 
1970s and, most importantly, sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council 
since 1992 (UNSC Res 731, 748, 883) were removed before 1999, that is, sev-
eral years before the decision to give up weapons of mass destruction. Sanctions 
from the European Union had also been softened since the late 1990s. The 
explanation based on the threat of regime change after the United States invaded 
Iraq is dubious, too, for two reasons: (1) The 1986 bombings intended to kill 
Gadhafi did not lead him to give up the WMD programs, so why should a more 
remote threat produce a stronger effect? (2) In the 1990s, during the secret nego-
tiations with the United States and the United Kingdom, the Libyan regime 
offered to give up its weapons of mass destruction after the threat of regime 
change was removed, not because of it. So technological failures, sanctions, and 
regime change policy in Iraq might have played a role in the decision to give up 
WMDs, but they neglect the fact that the Gadhafi regime had lost its original 
rationale for building the weapons and, since the early 1990s, its foreign policy 
and security perspective were shifting from pan-Arabism to pan-Africanism, a 
context in which the value of nuclear weapons was definitely lower. A fuller 
analysis of the Libyan case can be read in Pelopidas, Renoncer à l’arme 
nucléaire. 
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Nuclear weapons do not protect against coups, popular uprisings, 
and destabilization campaigns by non-state actors
Nuclear weapons may deter the United States from invading countries to 
change their regimes. However, they are powerless against coups, popu-
lar uprisings, or destabilization campaigns by non-state actors. As George 
Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn note, “In the case 
of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons did not prevent collapse or regime 
change”113 in 1990. In that respect, the lesson learned from the Libyan 
story assumes that the popular uprising alone would not have been 
enough to overthrow the regime. This might be true even if we remember 
that external support was not decisive in the success of the Egyptian upris-
ing against Hosni Mubarak.114 But does it mean that the United States and 
foreign powers would not have increased their support for the protesters 
in indirect ways? It is reasonable to assume that the allies would have 
welcomed opportunities to overthrow the regime by other means, too. If 
so, the defeat of the opponents of Gadhafi, had he kept his weapons pro-
gram, becomes even more uncertain. The popular uprisings in the Arab 
world tell another story. Even if they study popular uprisings and try to 
learn how to defeat them, dictators should fear their own populations. 
Nuclear weapons cannot protect them against popular uprisings.
Nuclear weapons cannot deter destabilization campaigns by seces-
sionist organizations and other non-state actors either. This was true 
during the Cold War and remains true today. Lebanese and Palestinian 
militant groups have launched offensives against Israel since the 1970s. 
In the 1980s, the Tamil Tigers attacked a presumably nuclear-armed India, 
and Chechen rebel groups have struggled against Russia since 1994.115 
Even if the purpose of these attacks was not to change the regime, it 
113.  George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Deterrence 
in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2011.
114.  Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 230.
115.  Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 145.
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is also worth recalling the Pakistani-supported terrorist attacks in India 
even after New Delhi officially became a nuclear-weapon possessor in 
1998, the terrorist attacks against US interests supported by Libya in the 
1980s, and the attacks of Al Qaeda against the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Russia.
This should not be read as an incentive to support violent insurrections 
in nuclear-weapon states since chaos would increase the risk of theft of 
nuclear material and possibly of nuclear use. If this analysis is correct, 
the United States should shift from a threat-based strategy—of which 
deterrence is one type—to a reassurance strategy, which credibly rejects 
regime change and emphasizes the increased vulnerabilities associated 
with nuclear-weapons possession.116 Awareness of this last point and of 
other limits of nuclear safety and security appears as a first step to make a 
dictator more amenable to giving up his weapons.
Could a dictator keep nuclear weapons indefinitely?
The dictatorship we are discussing is easy to identify: North Korea. If the 
problem is framed in terms of rogue states or states of concern, one should 
then include Iran if it acquires nuclear weapons and, possibly, Pakistan. 
The assumption is that because we think these leaders will never give up 
their nuclear arsenals, we should give up the goal of getting to zero. So 
would a world without nuclear weapons except for one dictatorship be 
more dangerous than the world we live in? To answer that question, one 
can then build two scenarios: either the dictator is non-deterrable and 
wants to create the maximum of damage or he is deterrable. In the first 
scenario, keeping nuclear weapons or not will not change the outcome, 
unless a credible missile defense is built117 and no accidental launch 
116.  For example, John Steinbruner suggested a form of cooperative or consensual 
security that would subordinate the practice of deterrence to that of 
reassurance in “Consensual Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists  
64, no. 1 (March–April 2008).
117.  This would require specifying the detection systems because even if a credible 
 missile-defense system were built, which is unlikely, the nuclear dictatorship could 
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happens: once the undeterrable dictator is in power and possesses a 
nuclear-weapon capability as well as delivery vehicles, millions will die. 
In the second scenario, the question becomes: can conventional capabil-
ities deter a nuclear attack?
Opponents of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons have not 
decoupled deterrence and nuclear weapons. “If such states cannot be 
disarmed,” argue Josef Joffe and James Davis, “they must be deterred. But 
how can nuclear weapons be deterred unless with nuclear weapons?”118 
The argument is misguided in multiple ways.
First, it misses the fact that nuclear disarmament is a long-term process 
and that the North Korean case will be reconsidered when we reach a 
lower level of nuclear arsenals in the world. By then, the situation will 
probably have changed in ways we cannot fully grasp today. For instance, 
in a world approaching zero nuclear weapons, stringent prohibitions on 
nuclear testing would be in place and efforts to detect cheaters would 
increase considerably, so the number of hidden weapons would be 
limited and they would probably not be tested. Given this uncertainty, 
renouncing a policy goal because of our expectations about the future 
behavior of a dictatorship grants the ruler of this state much more power 
and leverage than is deserved.
More fundamentally, the deterrent value of conventional capabili-
ties will have increased considerably and, in any case, these conven-
tional capabilities will remain sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage 
to a nuclear dictatorship. I realize that precision-guided munitions have 
been emphasized several times since the 1970s to re-legitimize con-
ventional deterrence, with only limited success.119 However, the recent 
send decoys to defeat it and launch its nuclear warheads only once the anti-ballistic 
missile defense had been defeated.
118.  Josef Joffe and James W. Davis, “Less than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament 
Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, January–February 2011: 8.
119.  The classical critique of conventional deterrence in general, and of this argument in 
particular, remains John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983).
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developments of drone technology and the project of prompt global strike 
capabilities should lead us to consider that these weapons may credibly 
be used to destroy key assets of a nuclear dictatorship. If so, their deter-
rent potential would be at least as good as that of nuclear weapons. In 
other words, US possession of a military advantage and destructive capa-
bility is one reason to believe in the efficacy of a conventional deterrent 
in these circumstances. Robert Jervis convincingly argues that it is over-
whelming and that small nuclear arsenals are not enough to compen-
sate.120 Even if this superiority declined, the broad coalition of countries 
that would unite against the threat of a nuclear-armed state in a world 
with only a few of them could create a convincing deterrent capability.121 
A few analysts even argue that progress in conventional capabilities and 
the so-called revolution in military affairs make the prospect of a decap-
itating first strike against a weak nuclear-armed state “more than just a 
theoretical possibility, although a state contemplating such a strike could 
be deterred by the remote possibility of nuclear retaliation.”122 The late 
ambassador-at-large Paul Nitze had already made this argument in his last 
op-ed for the New York Times on October 28, 1999.123
120.  Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, Rogue States and the U.S. Policy,” in Complex 
 Deterrence, 134.
121.  Dennis Gormley convincingly argues that US conventional superiority is an obsta-
cle to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in “American Conven-
tional Superiority: the Balancing Act,” in Getting to Zero. David Holloway and 
Edward Ifft rightfully observe that the enforcement problem would be harder if the 
cheater were a great power. See Edward Ifft, “Practical Considerations Related to 
Verification,” in Deterrence: Its Past and Future, 331; and David Holloway, “Deter-
rence and Enforcement in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” 343. 
122.  Michel Fortmann and Stéfanie von Hlatky, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: 
Impact of Emerging Technologies on Deterrence,” in Complex Deterrence, 317.
123.  Paul H. Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to Ourselves,” New York Times, October 28, 1999. 
Hypothesizing that there could be such a thing as unambiguous intelligence, he 
wrote: “As for the so-called rogue states that are not inhibited in their actions by the 
consensus of world opinion the United States would be wise to eliminate their 
nuclear capabilities with the preemptive use of our conventional weapons—when 
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Regarding the threat of theft of nuclear material and proliferation, the 
available quantity would be much smaller than it is now and all the for-
mer nuclear-weapon states would have a common incentive to enforce 
nonproliferation. As Pavel Podvig writes, “A world with North Korea 
as the only nuclear power would be a rather uncomfortable place, but 
the world in which it is the ninth nuclear weapons state is even more 
uncomfortable.”124
These two scenarios would require further elaboration about my 
assumptions in terms of latency, availability of other weapons, intentions, 
crisis stability, and interstate relations in the world I describe. In this chap-
ter, I just want to show that apparently obvious objections to the goal 
of a world without nuclear weapons become much weaker as soon as 
you decouple the notion of deterrence and nuclear weapons and keep in 
mind our current level of nuclear threat.
Conclusion: Beyond the “Nuclear Straitjacket”
Earlier in the chapter, I asked whether seventy years is a high enough stan-
dard of evidence for us to surrender our fate to nuclear weapons forever. 
In brief, we don’t know what caused the lack of war between great pow-
ers. Several answers compete. So far, we have decided to trust one answer 
that would cost millions of lives if it were proven wrong because there is 
no foreseeable protection against a nuclear strike.125 We will never reach 
necessary, and when we have unambiguous indication of these countries’ intent to 
use their nuclear capability for purposes of aggrandizement. The same principle 
should apply to any threat emanating from unstable states with nuclear arsenals.”
124.  Pavel Podvig, “What if North Korea Were the Only Nuclear Weapon State?,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 27, 2009.
125.  This has been true at least since nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles could be launched 
underwater from a submarine which is impossible to detect. As a consequence, 
destroying the missile before it is launched became impossible. It is well established 
that civil defense programs make promises that are impossible to keep. See Lee 
Clarke, Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago: 
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a level of certainty that makes this policy choice as obvious as some 
claim it to be.126 The critique of the goal of a world without nuclear weap-
ons raising the specter of the return of great-power war has to face this 
uncertainty. It must also face the mixed record of nuclear weapons as 
peacemakers.
Not only is the reliance on nuclear deterrence a bet portrayed as a 
certainty in practice if not in words, but this bet considerably overesti-
mates the peace-keeping capacities of this strategy. Nuclear deterrence 
has, at times, favored more risk-prone behavior in a series of cases, does 
not  avoid organizational and command-and-control problems, and 
has not been sufficient to keep the peace in a series of critical situations.
The idea that reaching a world without nuclear weapons will “unleash 
the dogs of war” is unconvincing.
We cannot and will not know for sure what kept peace in the last 
seven decades. Looking for certainties and silver bullets is what makes 
the nuclear peace hypothesis so appealing. What we know is that the 
long peace was limited in time and space, that luck played a significant 
role that cannot be replaced by deterrence, that we might not yet know 
the full extent of its role due to persisting secrecy about nuclear-weapons- 
related accidents and that nuclear deterrence as a strategy created more 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 30–40, 90–97; Dee Garrison, Bracing for 
Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). Even if the current missile-defense project could be made credible, it is not 
intended as a complete protection against a nuclear strike, for two reasons. First, it 
focuses on threats from regional powers only. Second, it is a US system and there 
is little prospect of sharing it. 
126.  This is quite a recent development. As Daniel Deudney aptly notes: “Early propo-
nents emphasized the tentative, second-best, and temporary character of [deter-
rence statism, i.e., the idea that nuclear weapons make war prohibitively costly], 
but many of its contemporary proponents are confident that this solution is highly 
enduring and close to the best of all solutions,” Bounding Power, 247. James 
Goodby and Steven Pifer develop this point in the last section of their chapter in 
this volume. On the role and risk of overstated certainties in the nuclear discourse 
and the shift from one to another, see Benoît Pelopidas, “Critical Thinking about 
Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (2010): 191–193.
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risk-prone behavior on the part of the nuclear possessors and did not ulti-
mately prevent nuclear-armed states from fighting a war.
So the only question worth asking is whether a war among great pow-
ers would be more or less likely than it is now. The trend toward a decline 
in inter-state wars seems to be robust and suggests that such wars might 
be less likely. In any case, war in a world without nuclear weapons would 
not run the risk of nuclear escalation, provided that the absence of such 
weapons is properly enforced.
To sum up, nuclear proliferation risks are not likely to increase if the 
United States decreases the size of its nuclear arsenal. A closer look at 
nuclear history demonstrates that, contrary to the accepted wisdom, a 
positive nuclear security guarantee has not been a silver bullet for non-
proliferation even if it played a role in a couple of nuclear choices. 
Current policy discussions overestimate the appeal of nuclear weapons 
and wrongly assume that states are seeking to organize their national 
security around the alternative between an independent nuclear deter-
rent and a “nuclear umbrella.” They neglect the most recent studies that 
underplay the threat of massive proliferation of nuclear weapons by states 
in the next decades as well as the challenges associated with successful 
proliferation. More importantly, they underestimate the enormous credi-
bility problem of extended nuclear deterrence and the facts that it might 
make the protégé feel more insecure or, on the contrary, might not alter 
his plans for a national nuclear-weapons capability. These key problems 
of extended nuclear deterrence are going to remain for the foreseeable 
future. Finally, extended nuclear deterrence is not well-equipped to deter 
terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Because of these problems, 
a more cooperative and tailored policy of security guarantees could 
be elaborated that would not rely so explicitly on nuclear weapons. 
Conventional threats would be much more credible and would not invite 
nuclear retaliation.127 This shift, which would require close consultations 
127.  This borrows and modifies Scott Sagan’s argument in “The Commitment 
Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter 
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with allies who understand the nuclear umbrella as the ultimate sign of 
US protection, would free the United States from a possible reputation 
cost of not keeping its promises if an ally is attacked. It might also address 
the concerns of allies who consider that having US nuclear weapons on 
their soil makes them more vulnerable.
The idea that dictators will never give up their nuclear arsenal is not 
entirely convincing. It might seem to be early to consider this case, but 
opponents of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons intend to use 
it to delegitimize the goal and stop the conversation. So it is worth rebut-
ting the argument right now. To do so, one should emphasize that nuclear 
weapons do not protect against coups, popular uprisings, or destabiliza-
tion campaigns by non-state actors and that the incentives for a  nuclear- 
armed dictator to disarm would be enormous.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will suggest three ways in which 
opponents to nuclear status quo or endless modernization can move the 
conversation beyond the nuclear straitjacket.
Address the contradiction between nuclear deterrence  
and nonproliferation
The perceived value of nuclear weapons and the scope of their mission 
have evolved. Historically, their scope has been shrinking. The period 
starting in the 1990s—reaffirming that nuclear weapons can also deter 
chemical and biological attacks—appears anomalous. Therefore, decou-
pling “nuclear” from “deterrence” in order to reassess the added deterrent 
value of nuclear weapons and the effectiveness of deterrence as a strat-
egy remains promising. This endeavor might highlight the contradiction 
between absolute faith in nuclear deterrence and unconditional rejec-
tion of nuclear proliferation. Indeed, a strong faith in nuclear deterrence 
as an exceptional strategy for great-power peace and nonproliferation 
would actually contradict US efforts toward nonproliferation: logically, 
Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks,” International Security 24, no. 4 
(Spring 2000).
GS_WarNotFought.indb   51 3/5/15   8:47 AM
52  |  BENOÎT PELOPIDAS
if nuclear weapons are peacemakers provided that they spread slowly 
and in a managed way, one should welcome their spread.128 On a policy 
level, it would overstate the otherwise declining utility of these weapons 
for security and regime survival instead of emphasizing our common vul-
nerability to the nuclear danger. As a consequence, pretending that the 
“atomic magic” is intact would encourage proliferation129 and, because of 
the tendency of dictators attracted to the bomb to overstate their potential 
achievements as I outlined above, would jeopardize the main rationale 
for these leaders to give up their nuclear ambitions. Therefore, shifting 
toward a “no-first-use policy” seems to be the next step, for three main 
reasons. First, it would decrease reliance on nuclear weapons by reduc-
ing the scope of their mission. Second, it would avoid a “commitment 
trap”130 leading the United States to lose credibility if it does not respond 
to a WMD attack with nuclear weapons. Third, since the expected casu-
alties on the US side after this type of strike are much more limited, it 
might “bolster conventional deterrence”131 by increasing the reputation 
for resolve of the United States.
128.  Kenneth Waltz is consistent in that respect. See “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: 
Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2012. 
French theorist Pierre-Marie Gallois made the same argument.
129.  This is why the choice we are facing for the future is often characterized as either 
nuclear proliferation or global nuclear disarmament. George P. Shultz, William 
J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn wrote that “continued reliance on 
nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is encouraging, or at least 
excusing, the spread of these weapons,” in “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Pro-
liferation,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2011. See also Holloway, “Deterrence and 
Enforcement in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” 363; and Sagan, “The Great 
Debate,” 88.
130.  See Sagan, “The Commitment Trap”; and Scott Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” 
Survival 51, no. 3 (June–July 2009), 171.
131.  Michael Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International 
Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 47; and Fortmann and von Hlatky, “The Revolution in 
Military Affairs,” 309–310.
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Engage the expected veto player
The amount of opposition to the goal might be overestimated. Cold War 
history offers several examples of high-level US and Soviet officials who 
understood that the current course of nuclear policy in their country was 
flawed but did not speak up because they thought a third party would be 
reluctant to change and powerful enough to block any change.132
For example, the US secretaries of defense under the Ford and Carter 
administrations kept referring to an external audience that was supposed 
to believe that the balance of nuclear forces was a relevant measurement 
of American power. This supposed belief about other international actors 
seems to have been a central driver of nuclear policies. In the report 
to Congress for fiscal year 1975, President Ford’s secretary of defense, 
James Schlesinger, recognized that the Soviet Union was in no position 
to launch a disarming first strike against the United States or even hope to 
do so, but nonetheless called for immediate measures to counter the 
increase in size of their nuclear arsenal. “There must be essential equiv-
alence between the strategic forces of the US and the Soviet Union—­
an equivalence perceived not only by ourselves, but by the Soviet Union 
and third audiences as well.”133 This expected perception by a third party 
is decisive in his reasoning. He therefore concludes that “to the degree 
that we wish to influence the perception of others, we must take appro-
priate steps (by their lights) in the design of the strategic forces.”134 In 
other words, the supposed perception of the US arsenal by other actors 
 
132.  At the end of a historical investigation of the support for the goal of a world without 
nuclear weapons in the United States, Jonathan Pearl concluded that “when the 
barriers to disarmament seemed lowest, political and popular enthusiasm for this 
goal largely dissipated.” Jonathan Pearl, “Forecasting Zero: U.S. nuclear history 
and the low probability of disarmament,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War 
College, November 2011: 40–41.
133.  Steven Kull, “Nuclear Nonsense,” Foreign Policy 58 (Spring 1985): 32. Author’s 
italics.
134.  Ibid., 32–33.
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was a major driver in designing the force beyond the requirements of 
deterrence.135 These “third parties” might have been more amenable 
to change than had been supposed. In other words, some change was 
achievable if they had not anticipated that the opponents to change were 
impossible to convince or defeat. Engaging them and revealing those past 
missed opportunities is a first step.
The number of opponents to the goal might diminish in another way. 
Historically, a few genuine opponents to nuclear disarmament and 
arms control turned out to be involuntary supporters: they crafted pro-
posals that were so ambitious or so demanding that the Soviets would 
not accept them. As in the cases described above, they were wrong 
about the “expected veto player” in a way that ended up promoting 
nuclear disarmament. A case in point would be Richard Perle’s support 
of the “zero option” in the early 1980s. In other words, the United States 
would forgo the deployment of Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise 
missiles in Europe if the Soviets gave up their intermediate range forces. 
It has been most often interpreted as an option designed to be unac-
ceptable by the Soviets136  .  .  . but five and a half years later, General 
Secretary Gorbachev accepted it within the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
treaty framework.137
These instances suggest that proponents of change might be more 
numerous than we think but that convincing them is not enough. They 
135.  Ibid. The entire article is a convincing case for this. Other good examples are the 
report to Congress by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in 1979, and Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara asking for more weapons after he learned that the mis-
sile gap was in the United States’ favor.
136.  William E. Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 167; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace 
Through Strength’ End the Cold War? Lessons from INF,” International Security 16, 
no. 1 (Summer 1991): 170.
137.  Thomas Risse-Kappen, The Zero Option: INF, West Germany and Arms Control 
(New York: Westview, 1988), 82.
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also have to come to believe that coming out as a proponent of change is 
safe for them and effective.138 Tactical mistakes will do the rest.
Think about possible futures, beyond proliferation
Things that never happened before happen often. This is also true in 
the nuclear arena even if analysts and policymakers in this field tend to 
see the unprecedented only as bad news. For example, unprecedented 
cases of nuclear disarmament in South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan were not anticipated by academic analysts and intelligence 
agencies alike.139 They were unprecedented and unexpected: before they 
happened, all the observers would have said that they were impossible. 
Similarly, in 1986, who would have expected that the global nuclear 
stockpile would have been reduced by two-thirds in the next twenty-five 
years?140 This worst-case assumption is still there today, with the degrada-
tion of the recent climate taken by the opponents to the goal of zero as 
revealing the truth of its impossibility. This pessimistic view of the world 
assumes that the latest wave of support for disarmament will be the last 
one, carrying a definitive verdict about the possibility of future nuclear 
arms levels. Contrary to this myopic view of the world, past failures of 
worst-case scenarios suggest that a disarmament initiative might happen 
in the future, too, in spite of the fact that we do not anticipate it now.141
138.  This argument is fully developed in my “Innovation in Nuclear Thinking: 
Incompetent, Dangerous or Futile,” under review by Ethics & International Affairs.
139.  Benoît Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation”; Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the 
Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 373–400.
140.  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories:  
1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 4 (July–August 2010): 81–82. 
Based on their most conservative estimates for 2010, the global nuclear stockpile 
has been reduced by 67.6 percent between 1986 and 2010. 
141.  Benoît Pelopidas, “La couleur du cygne sud-africain, Le rôle des surprises dans 
l’histoire nucléaire et les effets d’une amnésie partielle” (The Color of the South 
African Swan: The Role of Surprises in Nuclear History and the Effects of a Partial 
Amnesia), French Yearbook of International Relations, 2010 (in French),  
http://www.afri-ct.org/IMG/pdf/Pelopidas.pdf.
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